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The aim of this research is to assess the effect of manipulating hostility and 
credibility in a new product pre-announcement on the strength and speed of response by 
an incumbent competitive firm in a global market. 
 
The thesis adopts the new product pre-announcement (NPPA) definition provided 
by Eliashberg and Robertson (1988).  Eliashberg and Robertson (1988) define NPPA as 
“a formal, deliberate communication before a firm actually undertakes a particular 
marketing action such as a price change, a new advertising campaign, or a product line 
change.”   One major factor in this decision lies in the flexibility and breadth of NPPAs to 
include not just new product introductions, but other important dynamics that reside in 
the domain of a new product introduction, like related alliances and strategic goals. 
 
A reality of today's global competitive environment is that markets have become 
truly global in terms of global firms, from various countries around the globe, competing 
globally for customers.  This is true for many industries, for example the automobile 
industry in which Toyota recently surpassed GM as world's largest automaker.  The 
industry under study in this investigation, consumer electronics, is such an industry.  
Published literature suggests that even though markets have globalized, the U.S. is still 
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the predominant location for NPPA/NPA, even by foreign competitors.  This is likely 
because of the size and importance of the market to global competition within these 
global markets. 
 
NPPA as Market Signals 
 At its most basic form pre-announcing behavior is a form of market signaling.  
All new product announcements (NPAs) and NPPAs are market signals that are sent by 
the signal sender and received by the signal receiver.  How these signals are interpreted is 
largely dependent on the contingent factors of the particular market and other aspects like 
senders' reputation etc.  NPPAs are often associated with competitive actions and 
reactions. 
 
Competitive reactions have been defined as “a set of decisions by a firm in 
response to an observed competitive action (Kuester, Homburg, and Robertson 1999, 
p.90).”  It is important to note that competitive responses or reactions can be multi-
dimensional in nature (Kuester, Homburg, and Robertson 1999).  Kuester, Homburg, and 
Robertson enumerate five such dimensions.  These include an instrumental dimension, an 
intensity dimension (or aggressiveness), a breadth dimension, a speed dimension, and a 
domain dimension.  This thesis looks at two of these dimensions in particular: 1) speed of 
response and 2) aggressiveness of response.   
  
Speed of reaction is essentially the time it takes a competitor to react to a 
particular competitive signal that is sent by another firm in the industry.  For example, 
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once a NPPA has been issued, a signal receiver or competitor will respond with varying 
degrees of speed, some might react immediately while others take longer to respond.  
Kuester, Homburg, and Robertson (1999) define speed of reaction as the time lag 
between competitive threat and response.   
  
Competitive responses also differ in their aggressiveness.  Based on factors like 
perceived signal credibility or perceived hostility, a competitive reaction may vary in 
aggressiveness.  An aggressive response is one that tries to elicit a sense of threat within 
the original signal sender. 
 
Hypotheses 
Signal credibility determines whether or not an incumbent is likely to react, and 
how strongly they will react, to a NPPA signal (Chen & Miller 1994).  In this thesis, I 
argue that credible signals will induce faster reactions.  Rao, Qu, and Ruekert (1999) 
argue that credibility is achieved when the signal sender will suffer a monetary penalty 
for sending false signals.  Irreversibility of commitment, a second dimension of 
credibility, rates the likelihood of a signal not being fulfilled.  Research has shown that 
high irreversibility increases the propensity to respond to a NPA signal (Chen and 
MacMillan 1992).  Rao, Qu, and Ruekert show that when the brand ally provides a 
credible signal and quality information is unobservable, the brand ally’s vulnerability to 
punishment is used by consumers to infer the quality of the focal brand’s product.  This 
suggests that the ally’s vulnerability to loss of future sales serves as a credible signal of 
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unobservable quality.  These results justify the use of an ally manipulation as mechanism 
for increasing the perceived credibility of an NPPA.   
 
Therefore, in this thesis I manipulate the credibility of an NPPA signal through a 
strategic alliance with another firm which is widely perceived as highly reputable.  The 
presence of an alliance in the signal is expected to increase the credibility of the NPPA.  
Based on the findings of Chen and Miller (1994), a credible NPPA signal should affect 
the strength of reaction and speed of reaction by incumbent firms (or signal receivers).  
Thus, the following hypotheses are offered in the thesis: a) The presence of a well-
known, reputable ally in an NPPA will lead to a stronger response by the signal receiver 
and b) The presence of a well-known, reputable ally in an NPPA will lead to a speedier 
response by the signal receiver. 
 
It has also been suggested that signal hostility has a positive relationship with 
speed and strength (magnitude) of reaction (Jervis 1976; Heil and Robertson 1991).  
Empirical tests have measured the relationship between hostile signals and magnitude of 
competitive reactions (Heil and Walters 1993; Mansfield 1990) concluding that the more 
hostile an NPPA signal, the stronger the competitive reaction will be.  Studies have also 
found that the greater the perceived threat, that is the more a competitor’s signal seems to 
attack a firm’s existing position, the shorter or quicker the response time (Chen, Smith, 
and Grimm 1992; MacMillan, McCaffery, and Van Wijk 1985).  I argue that an NPPA 
announcing the launch of a new product in one month would be more threatening for 
incumbent firms than if the announced launch is scheduled to occur in a year’s time.  
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Including additional information about the status of a patent application provides 
credibility to the launch date and can be hypothesized to heighten the perceived hostility 
of the signal.  Based on these arguments, this thesis presents the following hypotheses: a) 
An NPPA with a shorter lead-time will be associated with a stronger response by the 
signal receiver and b) An NPPA with a shorter lead-time will be associated with an 
increased speed of response by the signal receiver. 
  
I also argue in this thesis that signal credibility is a minimum requirement for a 
competitor to respond to an NPPA.  Chen and Miller (1994) have made the same 
suggestion.  This is based on the premise that engaging in a competitive reaction involves 
certain costs, including time and financial resources.  Unless the initial NPPA signal is 
credible, the incumbent firm would essentially be wasting time and money in formulating 
and implementing a response.  Previous studies have failed to test the interaction of 
signal credibility and signal hostility as predictors of signal receiver response.  This is a 
principal contribution of this thesis.  This thesis argues when perceived signal credibility 
is low the immediacy of product introduction or lead-time mentioned in the NPPA is 
irrelevant. Essentially, the signal is not believable.  In contrast, short lead-times and 
patent application status is predicted to affect anticipated response strength and speed 
when the presence of an ally increases signal credibility.  The following hypotheses are 
presented: a) An NPPA with shorter lead-time will lead to an increased strength of 
reaction when an ally is present, but will have no effect when there is no ally and b) An 
NPPA with shorter lead-time will lead to an increased speed of reaction when an ally is 




In this thesis a 2X2 factorial design is used.  One of the factors is the presence 
(absence) of an ally the new product and the other is the time to product launch.   The 
alliance partner was manipulated by providing a previously unknown NPPA signal 
sender an ally that is credible and respected in the market.  Apple Inc., a major firm in the 
global consumer electronics industry was chosen as the ally.  The second manipulation 
was the time to product launch and patent status.  In one scenario, the product launch 
would happen one month after the NPPA signal was sent.  The other scenario had the 
product being launched one year after the NPPA signal is sent.  In the one month to 
launch scenario, the patent application had already been filled prior to the release of the 
NPPA.  In the twelve months to launch scenario, it is simply stated that a patent 
application will be submitted soon.   
  
The NPPA signal was provided in the form of a press release.  Since published 
literature suggests that the U.S. is the primary market for NPPA in the global consumer 
electronics industry, the press release adopts the English language and is based on actual 
press releases from the U.S.  Previous data collected by Robertson, Eliashberg, and 
Rymon (1995) show that an overwhelming majority of NPPA signals were detected by 
the incumbent firms or signal receiving firms in trade journals and press announcements.  
Four versions of the press release were designed.  They either had an ally or not, and time 
to introduction was either one month with a patent application already filed or one year 
with a patent application yet to be submitted. The stimuli were based on common press 
releases found in trade journals.   
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The sampling frame consisted of MBA students at Oklahoma State University.  
MBA students were chosen because of their ability and training in making business 
decisions as well the international dimension of the MBA student body.  Ideally, the 
research would have been conducted with real world marketing mangers.  Due to 
availability within the required time frame, MBA students were used.  Because MBA 
student vary in terms of their job histories, work experience and job titles were captured 
as potential covariates. 
  
Each individual was randomly assigned to one of the four scenarios.  The data 
were collected via questionnaire format. Upon reading the NPPA press release, the 
students are asked to answer questions based on their assumed role as the marketing 
manager of Pacific Corp.   In total the instrument contained 36 questions, 22 of them 
were related to the measurement of the constructs being studied.  The remaining 14 
questions were split equally between manipulation checks and demographic questions.  
Most respondents took around 15 minutes to complete the process, from reading the 
NPPA press release to answering all the questions. A total of 100 completed and useable 
surveys were returned for a response rate of 83%. 
  
I assessed all constructs as multi-item measures. In addition, I scored each item on 
a seven-point likert scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7).  
Previously used measures of response speed and response strength were adopted from the 
literature.  In addition, I collected data on perceived product advantage and familiarity 
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with the ally as potential covariates.  I also collected items to use as manipulation checks 




The empirical results generally do not support the hypotheses offered in this dissertation.  
In particular, there was no effect of the manipulations on speed of response.  I was able to 
observe an effect of aggressiveness of response.  Chapter IV goes in depth about the 






This chapter provides an in depth synopsis of the literature that has been reviewed 
in an effort to conceptualize the research question for this research, and to provide the 
theoretical background for the purposes of this study.  I look at new product pre-
announcement literature and competitive response literature.  The chapter concludes with 
the hypotheses I plan to test in this thesis. 
 
New Product Pre-Announcement 
Definition 
Extant literature in the field of Marketing has often used the terms New Product 
Pre-Announcement/s (NPPA) and New Product Announcement/s (NPA) interchangeably.  
Consequently, this thesis tries to make a distinction between the two terms in an effort to 
provide clarity, and more importantly, obtain an operationalizable definition for the 
purposes of its research. 
 
Eliashberg and Robertson (1988) define NPPA as “a formal, deliberate 
communication before a firm actually undertakes a particular marketing action such as a 
price change, a new advertising campaign, or a product line change.”  This appears to be 
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the first junction in the literature (if not the most important), where the term pre-
announcement has been used.  A similar definition for NPPA defines it as a 
communication about a product well in advance of its actual introduction, (Koku 1998).  
It has been suggested that the ‘newness’ of a product may or may not be perceived as 
such by the external environment (Eliashberg and Robertson 1988).  According to 
Eliashberg and Robertson, direction and timing of preannouncements maybe multi-
faceted. It may be directed to just one or many members of the audience, or sent either a 
day or months earlier 
 
NPA have been defined as signals in the form of an announcement or a move that 
precedes an actual new product introduction (Robertson, Eliashberg, and Rymon 1995). 
Robertson et al. focus on intentional signals sent by the firm to their competitors.  
According to them, such signals can be directed at a single member or multiple members 
of the audience.  This audience can include suppliers, retailers, consumers, competitors or 
other members of trade.  It has been argued by Robertson et al. that intentional signals 
directed at competitors are often performed to influence competitive behavior.  Another 
point that Robertson et al. make is that, product preannouncements as found in the 
literature usually refer to NPA signaling to consumers, and that such preannouncements 
maybe important to the success of a new product.  Wind and Mahajan (1987) include 
preannouncement as part of pre-launch activities that a firm conducts to increase 




It is clear from the definitions listed above that there are considerable similarities 
between the two terms, and in most cases they could be used interchangeably.  For 
example, both definitions focus on the timing of the announcements; NPA and NPPA 
should precede the actual product introduction, and by definition they relate to a product 
or service offered by a firm.  Another commonality between the two definitions is the fact 
that both are intentional, whether or not they are carefully planned and executed. 
 
However, one could argue that a ‘NPA’ should solely by used to signal a new 
product introduction (and related information), whereas a ‘NPPA’ should be used to 
signal, not only a new product introduction, but a wider domain of information that might 
encompass the related marketing mix of the new product, strategic alliances formed in 
regards to the new product, or a new R&D/technological breakthrough related with the 
new product.   
 
On the other hand, the distinction between NPA and NPPA has often been based 
on timing.  Under this distinction, a NPA would succeed a NPPA, for example a firm 
could issue a NPPA one year in advance and follow up with an NPA at the time of 
product introduction.  This would suggest that an NPPA could at times be false or 
unrealized, whereas an NPA in almost all cases would be followed by an introduction.  
Bayus, Jain, and Rao (2001) talk at length about the phenomenon of false or unrealized 
NPA/NPPA – what they call ‘vaporware.’  Bayus et al. argue that vaporware could be 
used by dominant firms in an industry to build entry barriers, and as such argue its 




Therefore, this thesis makes a distinction between NPA and NPPA primarily 
based on its content and purpose, where a sole focus on product introduction related 
information would imply the use of a NPA, and anything else that falls within a wider 
domain would entail the use of a NPPA.   
 
For the purposes of this research, the thesis adopts the NPPA definition provided 
by Eliashberg and Robertson (1988).  One major factor in this decision lies in the 
flexibility and breadth of NPPA to include not just new product introductions, but as 
mentioned earlier, other important dynamics that reside in the domain of a new product 
introduction, like related alliances and strategic goals. 
 
NPPA a Global Phenomenon 
It is important to note that NPPA behavior is not specific to the U.S. business 
environment.  This can be deduced from the fact that new product introductions are not 
specific to the U.S. market.  Companies, regardless of their citizenship, often  launch 
products in the global market (Chryssochoidis 2000).  In many industries, for example 
the chemicals industry, global new product introductions are growing faster than 
domestic product introductions (Grabowski and Wang 2006).  This is a direct result of 
globalization, where firms and industries compete against each other in an environment 




Regardless of globalization, it is important to note that the U.S. is the leading 
market as far as global product launches are concerned (Grabowski and Wang 2006).  
Taiwan is also a major source of new product introductions especially in the electronics 
and software industries (Chien and Wu 2006).  For example Toshiba Inc. introduced a 
new product eight months before scheduled introduction, and Phillips announced a new 
product six months ahead of production, both announcements being made in the U.S. 
(Keenan 2002).   
 
From the above argument, it becomes clear, that though NPPA behavior is largely 
turning into a global phenomenon, it is still an exercise that is mainly performed in the 
U.S.  This could be a result of the fact that the U.S. is still the largest economy 
worldwide, and it introduces a larger number of new products.  In light of this, I try to 
explain NPPA as a global phenomenon, however it must be noted that NPPA behavior is 
largely an exercise conducted in the U.S. 
 
Benefits and Costs 
NPPA have many drivers and they are closely associated with the benefits of 
sending a NPPA signal along with the potential costs of not sending one. There are 
various benefits associated with signaling NPPA.  These benefits accrue to both the 
signal sender and signal receiver.   
 
Benefits of signaling a NPPA for the sender basically revolves around the fact 
that increased information and increased leverage outweigh the potential costs, (Heil and 
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Robertson 1991).  According to Heil and Robertson (1991), the major potential benefits 
that arise from signaling for the sender include preemption to discourage competitors, 
and the development of competitive norms of conduct.   
 
Competitive preemption is considered a common rationale for NPPA signaling.  If 
the sender, signals early about a new product, then competitors might be discouraged 
from following the same market segment or product category. However, the likelihood of 
achieving such a preemptive advantage lies in the firm’s ability to convey a position of 
high fixed commitment towards the product, or the ability to develop barriers to entry 
through strategic alliances or access to an efficient distribution system.  On a related note, 
Robertson Eliashberg, and Rymon (1995) talk about using NPA signals to encourage 
early competitive reactions in an effort to reveal competitors plans, in other words to 
figure out what they have up their sleeve.  This potential source of valuable information 
is indeed useful in forming strategic decisions for the firm. On the other hand, NPA 
signals can also be used as a signal of cooperative pursuit in an effort to find partners or 
alliances.  This emphasis on cooperative pursuits is studied further by Rabino and Moore 
(1989), and state that a NPA signal could be sent in an effort to seek alliances or to 
encourage complimentary product designs.  Rabino and Moore indicate that this is 
common practice in the computer industry.  NPA signals are also used to encourage the 
use of a particular product design among competitors (Farrell and Saloner 1986; Gilbert 
1992).  Preemption via the use of NPA or NPPA signaling is also highly apparent when 
there is a battle over dominant designs.  This is currently being witnessed in the battle 
between Blue-Ray and High-Definition DVD formats.   
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Competitive norms of conduct can be read as ‘rules of engagement’.  Essentially, 
NPPA help establish certain ground rules for competition among the various competitors 
to a signal sender.  Introductory price points, patent-protected technology, product 
features all which are potential information carried within a NPPA signal tend to 
establish these rules.  However, regardless of the intentions of the signal sender in 
establishing these competitive norms of conduct, unless the sender has a certain level of 
market dominance or ability to enforce sanctions, the sender will be unable to establish 
any ‘rules’ (Heil and Robertson 1991).   
 
It is important to note that preemption and establishing competitive norms of 
conduct serve as benefits of NPPA for competitors or signal receivers as well.  A 
competitor instead of being discouraged by an NPPA, might realize that it is ahead of the 
signal sender in some aspect, and could send a retaliatory signal that negates the 
preemptive tactics of the original signal sender.  When it comes to rules of engagement, a 
signal receiving firm might feel that it has the leverage to levy a sanction on the signal 
sender, and might take appropriate action in that direction.  This would once again negate 
the tactic canceling the perceived benefits to the signal sender. 
 
Other benefits to NPPA include the signal sender’s ability to advertise the firm’s 
presence at the cutting edge of technology, prepping the market for the new product 
introduction by giving customers and distributors early information, and providing 
information to financial markets (Fisher, McGowan, and Greenwood 1985; Landis and 
Rolfe 1985; Wu, Balasubramnian, and Mahajan 2004).   
 
 16 
Many studies indicate a positive relationship the between benefits of pre-
announcing and the advantages of being a market pioneer.  There is empirical advantage 
to support the existence of a pioneering advantage (Biggadike 1979; Robinson and 
Fornell 1985; Urban et al. 1986).  Many of these empirical studies draw on the use of the 
PIMS database for collecting data.  However, there are many problems associated with 
the use of the PIMS database in regards to identifying first-mover advantage.  For 
instance PIMS accounts for only ‘survivor’ or ‘surviving’ firms (that is, there might be a 
sampling bias), second PIMS data rely heavily on self reports or single informants to 
classify pioneers, and finally the definition of the word pioneer within the PIMS database 
is not the same term used by researchers (PIMS definition a of Pioneer: One of the 
pioneers in first developing such products or services), it does not identify the first firm 
(Golder, and Tellis 1993).  Therefore the link between benefits of pre-announcing 
behavior and pioneer firm is, at best, questionable. 
 
In addition to the many benefits of NPPA signaling, there are many potential costs 
associated with the activity.  These costs lie in the form of potential risks to the signal 
sender.  Many have advocated the use of a cost/benefit analysis in judging the signaling 
value of NPPA.  The major risks associated with NPPA include competitive cuing, 
product line cannibalization, and potential risks to the senders’ reputation (Eliashberg and 
Robertson 1988; Heil and Robertson 1991).  
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Perhaps the most important cost of NPPA signaling is the risk of competitive 
cuing.  Competitive cuing implies revealing information to a firm's competitors about the 
firm's activities and strategic plans.  Since NPPA contain various types of information 
regarding a ‘yet to be released’ product, competitors or signal receivers are provided the 
benefit of a partial look into the future of the signal sender.  This allows them to alter 
their strategies or plans, to counter the perceived plans of the signal sender.  This can be 
done in a variety of ways including shortening lead-times, initiate spoiler actions in the 
market place (by overloading distribution channels), or worse, make R&D investments to 
deliver a competing product (Heil and Robertson 1991).  Thus, competitive cuing is a 
major potential pitfall to NPPA by signal senders if it is not planned thoroughly.  
However the cost of competitive cuing has been posited to have a negative relationship 
with barriers to entry the firm establishes.  For example a strong patent in a particular 
technology or product will reduce the chances of competitive cuing.   
 
Another cost associated with NPPA is the potentially serious risk of cannibalizing 
the signal senders’ present product line.  Once a NPPA has been executed, consumer 
demand for the present product line will drop in anticipation of the newly announced 
product, and distributors will reduce inventories to reflect the drop in consumer demand 
and prepare for the new product launch.  This leaves the signal sending firm vulnerable in 
terms of product line cannibalization, and not to mention the related loss of sales and 
revenue.  This situation might lead to delays or even cancellation of the new product 
introduction due to lack of financing or cash flow, in addition, main competitors might 




Reputation of firm may also be affected as a result of a NPPA. for example, if 
there are any delays or problems after the NPPA, the firm could see a loss of credibility, 
thereby taking a hit on its reputation.  Vaporware, as Bayus, Jain, and Rao (2001) studied 
in the software industry, is essentially the act of executing a NPPA without having any 
such product in the pipeline or any intention of introducing a product.  Bayus et al. argue 
that vaporware leads to the same loss of reputation, if not at a bigger scale.  All this is 
important because the credibility of a firm determines how effective its signals are going 
to be.  A detailed discussion of credibility is offered later in the chapter. 
 
Eventually one could argue that the benefits and costs of NPPA are an antidote of 
the information asymmetry of signals.  The following section goes in depth about NPPA 
as market signals.  It is important to note that Eliashberg and Robertson (1988) view pre-
announcing and incumbent firms as relying on two main factors – consumer behavior and 
competitor behavior, where the pre-announcing firm focuses on the benefits and the 
incumbent competitors focusing on the perceived risks of preannouncement behavior 
 
NPPA as Market Signals 
 Much of the literature has adopted a practice of providing very broad definitions 
of signals.  Economists tend to define signals through an information perspective (Heil 
and Robertson 1991).  For example, Spence (1974), in his seminal piece, looks at signals 
through an employee productivity perspective.  Signals can also carry product quality 
and/or brand quality information (Boulding 1989; Engers 1987; Nelson 1974; Rao, Qu, 
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and Ruekert 1999), or the reputations and intentions of firms (Kreps and Wilson 1982; 
Scherer 1980).  Robertson and Eliashberg (1988) argue that this broad notion or 
definitions of the term leads to market inefficiencies.   
 
George Akerlof combines the term information asymmetry with market signals.  
According to Akerlof (1970), firms are unsure as to what new products a competitor may 
introduce, consumers might find it difficult to decide on buying a product now or wait for 
a newer product, all based on market signals.  This contends that signaling can lead to 
information asymmetry in the market, for example when a firm indulges in vaporware or 
tries to mislead a consumer, and as a result the market will deteriorate in size and 
potential.   
 
 In terms of competitive market signaling, Porter provides a more fitting definition 
of signals.  His definition is as follows “A market signal is any action by a competitor 
that provides a direct or indirect indication of its intentions, motives, goals, or internal 
situation (1980, p. 75).”  Heil and Robertson modify Porter’s definition to apply it to a 
pre-announcement context, “Competitive market signals are announcements or previews 
of potential actions intended to convey information or to gain information from 
competitors (1991, p.403).” 
 
 From signaling theory in information economics (Spence 1974) and information 
asymmetry (Akerlof 1970; Kreps 1991), Rao, Qu, and Ruekert (1999) introduce 
credibility to pre-announcing signals.  They define signals as “an action that the seller can 
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take to convey information credibly …”  They state that signaling comes from two 
sources: 1) dissipative signals, which involve expenditure in reputation building that will 
be forfeit should the quantity turn out to be poor, 2) non-dissipative signals, which do not 
involve any up-front expenditure but do place future profits at risk.   
  
At its most basic form pre-announcing behavior is a form of market signaling.  
All NPAs and NPPAs are market signals that are sent by the signal sender and received 
by the signal receiver.  How these signals are interpreted is largely dependent on the 
contingent factors of the particular market and other aspects like senders’ reputation etc.  
The next section discusses competition among firms in a particular market and how it 
affects a signal receivers’ competitive response to a NPPA signal. 
 
Competitive Response 
 Competition in most global markets involves the many challenges that firms face 
from other firms within a particular market environment.  Global marketing competition 
can take place in a variety of forms via the marketing mix, for example price wars or 
promotional battles. Since competition is a two-way process, it goes hand-in-hand with 
competitive responses.  For every competitive action in a global market, more often than 
not, there will always be a competitive reaction or response. Porter (1980) argues that 
threatening competitive actions, like NPA/NPPA or price decreases, have a negative 
impact on other firms’ profitability, and as a consequence, competitive responses exhibit 




In such an intense and globalized environment, information is a critical aspect of 
the competitive or competition domain.  But simply having access to competitive 
information from around the world is not sufficient to effectively chart a strategy or plan 
for success. Companies must adapt by infusing globally competitive awareness 
throughout their organization, and into every business process that deals with customers, 
competitors, and products. The cycle of gathering external information, analyzing it, 
determining an optimal response, and then engaging the business to execute, is called the 
competitive response lifecycle (cf. Day and Wensley 1988; Hunt and Morgan 1995; 
Porter 1979; Kotler and Keller 2006).  This is a key feature of competition in global 
markets. 
 
 Competitive reactions have also been defined as “a set of decisions by a firm in 
response to an observed competitive action” (Kuester, Homburg, and Robertson 1999, 
p.90).  More relevant towards this thesis, Hultink and Langerak (2002) define 
competitive reactions as the set of decisions made by a firm in response to an observed 
new product launch.  It is implied that there are many different forms of competitive 
reactions ranging from speed and strength to marketing mix reactions. Empirical research 
suggests that new product launch decisions usually invoke competitive reactions based on 
strength and speed.  
   
 Competitive responsiveness, is basically, the measure of a firms’ capability to 
respond to a competitive action by its’ global competitor/s.  It is important to note that 
competitive responses or reactions can be multi-dimensional in nature (Kuester, 
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Homburg, and Robertson 1999).  Kuester, Homburg, and Robertson enumerate five such 
dimensions. These include an instrumental dimension, an intensity dimension (or 
aggressiveness), a breadth dimension, a speed dimension, and a domain dimension (1999, 
p.91).   This thesis looks at two of these dimensions in particular: 1) Speed of Response 
and 2) Aggressiveness of Response.   
 
Speed of Response 
Speed of reaction is essentially the time it takes a competitor to react to a 
particular competitive signal that is sent by another firm within the global market.  For 
example, once a NPPA has been issued, a signal receiver or competitor will respond with 
varying degrees of speed, some might react immediately while others take longer to 
respond.  Kuester, Homburg, and Robertson (1999) define speed of reaction as the time 
lag between competitive threat and response.   
 
Though marketing has given due importance to the study of speed in new product 
development and market pioneering (Gatignon and Robertson 1993; Urban et al. 1986), 
extant literature has paid less attention to speed of reaction to competitive market signals.  
However, recently marketers have started to pay attention to the area, for example 
Bowman and Gatignon (1995) look at what are the determinants of response time when a 
new product is introduced.  Further, Gatignon, Robertson, and Fein (1997) look at speed 




Speed of reaction to a NPPA is determined by a number of factors.  These include 
innovativeness of the product (Gatignon, Robertson, and Fein 1997), perceived hostility 
(Robertson, Eliashberg, and Rymon 1995), rate of market growth (Bowman and Gatignon 
1995), size and dominance of the incumbent firm, price sensitivity in the market, and the 
number of competitors (cf. Bowman and Gatignon 1995; Ghemawat 1991; Kuester, 
Homburg, and Robertson 1999).  I would argue that speed of response is also likely to be 
a function of the global nature of the industry or market in which the firm competes. This 
thesis focuses on perceived hostility because it is the one factor that is a function on the 
NPPA itself.  All the others are properties of the product, the firm, the industry, or the 
market (including customers).  
  
Aggressiveness of Response 
 Global competitive responses also differ in their aggressiveness.  Based on 
various factors like perceived signal credibility or hostility, a competitive reaction may be 
aggressive in varying degrees.  An aggressive response is one that tries to elicit a sense of 
threat within the original signal sender. 
 
 Hostile actions, almost always, elicit some kind of competitive response from 
incumbent firms (Robertson, Eliashberg, and Rymon 1995), while at the same time they 
also increase the propensity for stronger reactions (Heil and Walters 1993). Robertson, 
Eliashberg, and Rymon try to measure different dimensions of reaction to NPPA signals 
by incumbent firms, and in doing so they look in depth at reaction aggressiveness and 
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argue that both signal hostility and signal credibility play an important role in the 
aggressiveness of the response. 
 
 Hultink and Langerak define signal hostility as the extent to which the approach 
used by the sender to introduce the new product is perceived as hostile.  ‘Hostile signals 
are expected to result in strong reactions because the livelihood of receiving competitors 
is threatened.’ (2002, p. 203). 
 
Summary 
NPPA are a prominent facet of competition in global markets.  Studies have 
suggested a positive relationship between a hostile signal and speed of reaction and 
magnitude (Heil & Robertson 1991).  Studies have also suggested that the level of 
aggression and speed of reaction are closely linked to the intended harm in the NPPA 
signal, whether or not the incumbent suffers any harm.  Non – hostile signals such as 
cooperative signals have been found to illicit positive reactions rather than hostile 
reactions. Based on the literature review, the perceived magnitude of a signal, whether in 
terms of hostility or credibility, may be perceived in a more volatile fashion in infant 
industries as opposed to mature industries where competition and competitive rules 
maybe established over a period of time.  This suggests that the impact of NPPA, 
regardless of perceived credibility and/or perceived hostility is more likely to occur 




Kuester, Homburg, and Robertson (1999), in their study combined the 
consequence and hostility signals to form the ‘threat signal’ and found perceived threat to 
be a significant predictor of speed of reaction.  One of the areas that this thesis 




 This section looks at the hypotheses that this thesis aims to test.  Hypotheses are 
offered with respect to perceived speed of reaction and strength of reaction.  
 
Signal Credibility 
Signal Credibility determines whether or not an incumbent in a global market is 
likely to react to a NPPA signal (Chen & Miller 1994).  A minimum requirement for a 
signal to inspire a reaction is that the signal be credible.  The credibility of a signal is two 
dimensional in the sense that it depends on the sender’s reputation and the irreversibility 
of the signal.  Rao, Qu, and Ruekert (1999) argue that credibility is achieved when the 
signal sender will suffer a monetary penalty for sending false signals.  It can be 
hypothesized that credible signals will induce faster reactions.  In their study of hostile 
and aggressive NPA signals, Robertson et al. (1995) did not make any inferences as to 
whether or not a credible signal may be perceived as hostile or whether it might, on its 
own, induce an aggressive reaction.  In this stream of literature, reputation is formed 
based on the consistency of past actions and fulfillment of prior signals. In this regard, 
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reputation can be seen as having a positive relationship with incumbent reactions to NPA 
signals.  Irreversibility of commitment, the second dimension of credibility, rates the 
unlikelihood of signal not being fulfilled.  Research has shown that high irreversibility 
increases the propensity to respond to a NPA signal (Chen and MacMillan 1992). 
 
Rao, Qu, & Ruekert (1999) explore the consequences of a brand alliance on 
credibility.  They argue that co-brands have the desirable consequence of enhancing 
quality perceptions when quality is not a priori observable.  So, a positive outcome for a 
brand occurs when the brand ally credibly communicates a level of quality that the focal 
brand is unable to communicate by itself.  Rao, Qu, and Ruekert show that when the 
brand ally provides a credible signal and quality information is unobservable, the brand 
ally’s vulnerability to punishment is used by consumers to infer the quality of the focal 
brand’s product.  This suggests that the ally’s vulnerability to loss of future sales serves 
as a credible signal of unobservable quality.  These results justify the use of a globally 
known and reputable ally manipulation as mechanism for increasing the perceived 
credibility of an NPPA.   
 
Therefore, in this thesis I manipulate the credibility of an NPPA signal through a 
strategic alliance with another firm, which is widely perceived as highly reputable in the 
global market.  The presence of an alliance in the signal is expected to increase the 
credibility of the NPPA. Based on the findings of Chen and Miller (1994), a credible 
NPPA signal should affect the strength of reaction and speed of reaction by incumbent 
firms (or signal receivers).  Thus, the hypotheses are: 
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H1A – The presence of a well-known, reputable ally in an NPPA 
will lead to a stronger response by the signal receiver. 
 
H1B – The presence of a well-known, reputable ally in an NPPA 
will lead to a speedier response by the signal receiver. 
 
Signal Hostility 
It has been suggested that signal hostility has a positive relationship with speed 
and strength (magnitude) of reaction (Jervis 1976; Heil and Robertson 1991).  Empirical 
tests have measured the relationship between hostile signals and magnitude of 
competitive reactions (Heil and Walters 1993; Mansfield 1990), concluding that the more 
hostile an NPPA signal, the stronger the competitive reaction will be.   Studies have also 
found that the greater the perceived threat, that is the more a competitor’s signal seems to 
attack a firm’s existing position, the shorter or quicker the response time (Chen, Smith, 
and Grimm 1992; MacMillan, McCaffery, and Van Wijk 1985).  However, extant 
research has failed to test the effect of announced product launch lead-time on perceived 
hostility.  I argue that an NPPA announcing the launch of a new product in one month 
would be more threatening for incumbent firms in the global market than if the 
announced launch is scheduled to occur in a year’s time.  
 
Robertson et al. (1995), state the existence and relevance of patents within an 
industry may constitute a potentially interesting variable affecting the likelihood of 
competitive reactions to NPA signals.  In marketing, patents are generally considered 
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barriers to entry (Porter 1980).  Robertson et al. (1995) contend that in situations where 
patent protection is involved, competition will be characterized by a higher level of 
sensitivity to NPA signals.  Robertson et al. expect that in these industries reactions to 
NPA signals will be more likely and aggressive at the same time.  Robertson et al. state 
that “when threatened by a competitor in an industry characterized by high patent 
protection, we hypothesize that the incumbent will protect the revenue base for the 
existing technology by reacting aggressively… (1995, p. 5).”  
 
The above implies the status of a patent application and the immediacy of the 
product launch can be used to manipulate signal hostility.  Information about patents 
within NPPA can provide valuable information to incumbent firms in the global market 
about the approximate launch period for the new product.  If the wording of an NPPA 
suggests that a patent application has not yet been filed, it would suggest that there is 
considerable time before product launch since obtaining patent acceptance would take a 
considerable amount of time.  On the other hand if the NPPA suggests that a patent has 
already been filed, this would suggest that the product launch is imminent.  Though, an 
NPPA might already contain information about launch dates for the product, including 
additional information about the status of a patent application provides credibility to the 
launch date and can be hypothesized to heighten the perceived hostility of the signal. 
 
Accordingly, I use patent timelines to provide credence for stated product launch 
timelines.  Because shorter lead-times to the introduction of a new product will lead to 
higher perceived hostility, such a signal should increase the strength and speed of 
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reaction by incumbent firms. On the other hand, if an NPPA is issued a year before the 
actual product launch, it would be perceived as less hostile to incumbents, thereby 
resulting in a lower strength and speed of response.  Based on these arguments, this thesis 
will test the following hypotheses: 
 
H2A – An NPPA with a shorter lead-time will be associated with a 
stronger response by the signal receiver. 
 
H2B – An NPPA with a shorter lead-time will be associated with 
an increased speed of response by the signal receiver. 
 
Interaction of Credibility and Hostility 
 I have argued earlier in this thesis that signal credibility is a minimum 
requirement for a competitor to respond to an NPPA within a global business 
environment.  Chen and Miller (1994) have made the same suggestion.  This is based on 
the premise that engaging in a competitive reaction involves certain costs, including time 
and financial resources.  Unless the initial NPPA signal is credible, the incumbent firm 
would essentially be wasting time and money in formulating and implementing a 
response.  Thus, it is important for incumbent firms in global markets to first assess the 
credibility of a signal prior to engaging in competitive reactions.  Previous studies have 
failed to test the interaction of signal credibility and signal hostility as predictors of signal 




 Since signal credibility is a precursor to all other messages within the NPPA 
signal, this thesis argues when perceived signal credibility is low the immediacy of 
product introduction or lead-time mentioned in the NPPA is irrelevant. Essentially, the 
signal is not believable.  Based on this argument, we should see a low level of response 
likelihood on both speed of response and strength of response when a received signal is 
judged to be non-credible.  In contrast, this thesis will test whether the immediacy of 
entry, as operationalized by short lead-times and patent application status, will affect 
anticipated response strength and speed when the presence of an ally increases signal 
credibility.  The following hypotheses are presented: 
 
H3A – An NPPA with shorter lead-time will lead to an increased 
strength of reaction when an ally is present, but will have 
no effect when there is no ally. 
 
FIGURE A 





H3B – An NPPA with shorter lead-time will lead to an increased 
speed of reaction when an ally is present, but will have no 
effect when there is no ally. 
 
FIGURE B 












The focus of the chapter is the methodology employed in this research.  My 
discussion focuses on the experimental design employed in this research which serves as 
its backbone.  This includes the manipulations I use in my research and the stimuli that I 
administer on the respondents.  I further go onto talk about the procedures used in data 
collection, focusing on the sample, the instrument administered, the data collection 
technique, and the measures I used within the instrument. 
 
Experimental Design 
 The empirical tests performed in this thesis are based on 2×2 factorial design.  
One of the factors is the presence or absence of an ally for the new product.  The other is  
the time to product launch and patent status.  Figure C on the next page describes the 











 In designing the manipulation involving the alliance, it became clear that using a 
well-known firm as the signal sender would present a confound.  To eliminate this 
concern a hypothetical firm with a fictional name was created to serve in the role of the 
signal sending firm.  The hypothetical firm was named Max, Inc., which was described as 
introducing a new earphone/headphone product in the consumer electronic industry – an 
important global market.  This previously unknown firm should have difficulty sending 
credible signals (Rao, Qu, and Ruekert 1999).  Credibility was manipulated by providing 
a well-known and respected firm that operates in compatible product-categories.  Apple 
Inc., a major global competitor in the computer and electronics industries, was chosen as 
the ally.  This firm’s international success with its I-pod product provides respondents 
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with a well-known global competitor with a complementary product as the signal sender 
(i.e. headphones that can be used with products such as I-pod).  Since the signal sender 
within this experiment is a hypothetical firm (Max Inc.), any firm that is widely 
recognized would provide credibility to its NPPA signal.  One of the major reasons for 
providing a reputable ally is that signaling by an unknown firm lacks credibility since the 
unknown firm could send a false signal with no cost (Robertson et al. 1995).  However, 
care was taken to make sure that the real world ally (Apple Inc.) did not have any major 
factors that would undermine its reputation or negatively influence its intended effect on 
perceived credibility.  In half the tests an ally was provided, while for the other half there 
was no ally mentioned in the NPPA.   
  
The second manipulation was the time to product launch and patent status.  Two 
separate intervals were chosen to indicate the expected time of launch.  In one scenario, 
the product launch would happen one month after the NPPA signal was sent.  The other 
scenario had the product being launched one year after the NPPA signal is sent.  The time 
intervals were chosen based on the work of Kohli (1999) and Keenan (2002) who present 
evidence that the average lead-time in NPPA is between four and six months.  Based on 
this evidence I replaced an earlier plan to use a three month interval for the short lead-
time condition with the shorter one month interval.  The purpose was to increase the 
difference in response time available to respondents from nine months to an entire year.  
Along with the time interval was a short description about the status of a patent 
application related to the product.  In the short lead-time to launch condition, the scenario 
stated that the patent application had been filed prior to the release of the NPPA.  
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Whereas in the long lead-time to launch condition, the scenario simply stated that a 
patent application will be submitted soon.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
status of the patent is intended to provide extra credibility to the launch timelines.  
Additionally, these manipulations reflect the reality of day to day business within a 
globally competitive market. 
 
Stimuli 
 Data collected by Robertson, Eliashberg, and Rymon (1995) show that an 
overwhelming majority of NPPA signals were detected by the incumbent firms (i.e. 
signal receiving firms) in trade journals and press announcements.  Accordingly, the 
NPPA signal scenario was operationalized in the form of a press release.  To increase the 
realism of the stimuli, it was based on several actual NPPAs extracted from the popular 
press.  The press release announces the new product based on a new technology that has 
been developed by Max.  Small descriptions about both the product and the technology 
are provided, along with information on options and accessories available for the product.   
 
Four versions of the press release were created, each of which operationalizes one 
of four cells in the 2×2 factorial design.  For the ally manipulation, the phrase “along 
with its alliance partner Apple, Inc.” was inserted in the first line of the press release.  For 
the lead-time manipulation, the third to last sentence in the press release was modified 
from “Max Inc. has already filed a patent application for the technology and the product 
will be available in 12 months” to “Max Inc. has as initial patent application for the 
technology that will be submitted soon and the product will be available in 1 month.” 
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Apart from these relatively slight manipulations, the wordings are exactly the same 
among all four press releases.  All four press releases are provided in Appendix A.  In a 
deliberate move, no pricing information was provided; the press release states that pricing 
information will be provided at the time of product introduction.  This was done to 
remove the possible effect of price on perceived hostility and perceived credibility. 
 
As stated above, the stimuli were based on actual press releases found in trade 
journals.  I pre-tested it along with the instrument.  The pre-test involved four marketing 
managers at local businesses in Stillwater, Oklahoma.  These managers unanimously 
agreed that the press release was realistic and believable.  No changes or modifications 




 The sampling frame consisted of MBA students at the Stillwater and Tulsa 
campuses of Oklahoma State University.  MBA students were chosen as opposed to other 
graduate students because of their ability and training to interpret various cues that might 
be important to making business decisions.  This frame was also relevant due to the 
international dimension of the MBA student body.  Since the sample would have to play 
the role of a manager within the incumbent or signal receiving firm and make managerial 




Specific MBA classes were selected to administer the instrument.  No particular 
procedures were adopted in selecting the classes since it was up to instructor approval 
whether or not the survey could be administered.  No remuneration or privileges were 
provided for taking part in the experiment.  Ultimately, the sample size was calculated at 
120 MBA students based on enrollment figures for the four class sections that were 
involved in the experiment.  In total, 100 completed and useable surveys were obtained.   
 
 Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four scenarios.  This was 
achieved by randomly collating the instruments prior to distribution.   
 
Instrument 
 The instrument was in a questionnaire format (Appendix B).  Though there were 
four separate scenarios, the items were identical across conditions.  The instrument was 
pre-tested with four marketing managers at local firms.  Though changes were not 
suggested to the stimuli, certain changes were recommended to the questionnaire.  Based 
on these suggestions, identified questions were made clearer and less ambiguous. 
 
Each questionnaire came with a cover page that contained the instructions and one 
of the four press releases.  The instructions required the MBA students to envision 
themselves as the marketing manager of an imaginary firm (Pacific Corp.).  Pacific Corp. 
is described as being an incumbent in the same industry as the signal sending firm (Max 
Inc.).  Upon reading the NPPA press release, the students are asked to answer questions 




 In total the instrument contained 36 questions.  Of these 22 were related to the 
measurement of the constructs being studied.  The remaining 14 questions were split 
between manipulation checks and demographic questions.  Most respondents took 15 
minutes to complete the process, from reading the NPPA press release to answering all 
the questions.    The instrument was in English – appropriate since even the foreign 
nationals in the MBA program are expected to be facile with the language.  If the study 
were replicated in other countries, the instrument would require translation, back 
translation, and additional pre-testing to ensure metric equivalence. 
 
Data Collection 
The data collection was conducted within the classroom setting.  The 
questionnaires attached with the cover page containing the NPPA press release and 
instructions were randomly distributed to the class.  Prior to the distribution of the 
instrument, as per Institutional Review Board (IRB) guidelines, an informed consent 
script was provided to the respondents (The IRB approval is in Appendix D).  This was 
followed by a quick review of the simple instructions that the subjects had to follow.  
Once the subjects were finished they were asked to return the questionnaires.  At all times 
I was present in the room while data was being collected, to answer any questions or 





I assessed all constructs as multi-item measures.  I scored each item on a seven-
point Likert scales ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7).  The 
scales were from Hultink and Langerak (2002).  However, these scales had all been 
developed by previous research in the field. 
 
Two constructs, hostility and perceived consequences to the incumbent, were 
measured using four-item scales.  Incumbent perceptions of signaling firm commitment 
was measured using a three-item scale.  The items were originally from Heil and Walter 
(1993) and Robertson et al. (1995).   Incumbent reaction scales were borrowed from work 
by Bowman and Gatignon (1995), Gatignon et al. (1989), and Heil and Walters (1993).  
These included a four-item scale for speed of reaction and a three-item scale to measure 
strength of reaction.  A three-item scale measure perceived product advantage was based 
on the work of Green et al. (1995) and Hultink et al. (1997).  A two-item scale was used 
to measure perceived aggressiveness of the entrant firm, this was based on the work of 
Chen et al. (1992) and Clark and Montgomery (1998). 
 
Along with these seven constructs, manipulation checks were included in the 
instrument.  This was done in an effort to verify that the manipulations had the intended 
effect.  Some potential covariates were also measured.  A four-item scale measured 
respondent’s familiarity with Max Inc., Pacific Corp., Apple Inc., and Sony Inc.  These 
functioned in two ways.  First, they allowed me to assess the whether respondents were 
more familiar with Apple Inc. and Sony Inc. relative to the familiarity with either of the 
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hypothetical firms: Max Inc. or Pacific Corp.  Additionally, it is possible that 
respondent’s judgments regarding response to the NPPA are in part a function of their 
familiarity with Apple.  Thus, familiarity with Apple may help reduce the experimental 
error making significant effects easier to detect.  Manipulation checks were also placed to 
assess the respondent’s recollection of the presence or absence of an ally, the lead time to 
introduction, and the product category involved.  Once again this permitted verification 






 This chapter reports the results of statistic analysis of the collected data.  I first 
assessed the qualities of the sample by analyzing demographic variables.  I then analyzed 
the measures with respect to reliability and unidimensionality.  I report coefficient alpha 
and corrected item-total correlations for each measure is discussed.  I used exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) to assess unidimensionality and those results are also reported 
herein.  Next, I analyzed the manipulation checks to assess the efficacy of the credibility 
(ally) and hostility (lead-time to introduction) manipulations.  After examining 
correlations among the dependent variables and potential covariates, I identified the 
variable consequence of the NPPA on firm’s sales as a suitable covariate due to its 
correlation with the dependent variables.  I then moved to testing the hypotheses using 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA).  I conclude the chapter by summarizing the results of 
the hypothesis testing. 
 
Demographic Analysis 
 Demographics indicate that the sample is relative young, with nearly 80% of the 
sample falling between the ages of 21 and 30.  The sample is 63% male which is typical 
of both MBA programs and gender percentages in the workforce.  Foreign citizens 
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represented 20% of the sample, most of them being either Indian or Chinese citizens. 
Given the nature of an MBA sample, the amount of depth of work history is a key 
variable with respect to this study. An initial analysis of the respondents suggests that 
approximately 37% of the sample had managerial work experience of more than one 
year.  Meanwhile, 51.4% of the sample had worked for at least three employers and at 
least 40% of the respondents had worked at the supervisor level or higher. The highest 
level of income earned indicated that only 21% of the sample had earned an annual 
income of $50,000 or higher while more than 50% had never earned more than $25,000.  
Thus, this sample is relative young and with a generally low level of actual work 




 Reliabilities were analyzed for each of the seven multi-item scales used.  Based 
on Voss, Stem and Fotopolous (2000) scales were considered reliable based on the 
observed level of alpha given the distribution of the responses, the history of the scale in 
prior published literature, and response patterns in the data.  The three hostility items 
exhibited an initial Cronbach’s alpha (α) of 77%.  The item-total correlations for the 
hostility construct were all above the .50 level, however hostility three was weakly 
correlated with the other two items and analysis indicated that dropping the item would 
increase α to .79.   I performed an exploratory principal component factor analysis (EFA) 
(with no rotation) using the standard Eigen value greater than 1 rule.  The items for 
hostility loaded on one factor with 68% of the total variance explained.  However, since 
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hostility three had a low communality, and given the results from the α analysis, I chose 
to rerun the EFA forcing a two-factor solution.  This showed that hostility three was 
loading on a second factor.   I reran the EFA with only hostility one and two, and 
explained variance increased to 82%.  I concluded that dropping the third item would be 
the best choice.  Table I shows the original EFA output and reliability. 
 
TABLE I 




Regarding the incumbents perception of the entrant’s commitment to the new 
product, the three-items produced an α of .90 with strong item-total correlations; 
indicating adequate reliability.  The scale loaded cleanly on one factor that explained 
83% of the variance (see Table II).  I next analyzed speed of reaction.  This three-item 
scale exhibited an α of 85%.  Item-total correlations were sizeable.  The items loaded 















I observed a problem with the four-item strength of reaction scale.  Poor 
reliability was exhibited in an α of .40 while item-total correlations for the four items 
ranged from .09 to .43.  The EFA resulted in a two-factor solution, with an explained 
total variance no higher than 39% (see Table IV).   Based on an analysis of the individual 
items correlations with the speed of response variable, I chose to use the first item as a 
single-item measure of response aggressiveness.  More discussion on how I handled this 
construct is presented later. 
 
TABLE IV 




Regarding the respondents’ perception of the consequences of the new product on 
the incumbent firm, which was measured using a four-item scale, an α of .89 with all 
item-total correlations above .75 indicated a reliable scale.  The items loaded on a single 
factor with 76% of the total variance explained indicating acceptable unidimensionality 
 
 46 
(see Table V).  Moving to the 2-item scale for perceived aggressiveness of the NPPA, the 
scale was judged reliable with an α of .77 and item-total correlations greater than .62.  
The items loaded on to one factor with total variance explained of 81% (see Table VI).  
Finally product advantage was measured using three items, which was judged to be 
reliable with an α of .87.  Inter-item correlations all greater than .50. These items also 
loaded cleanly onto a one-factor solution with 79% of the total variance explained (see 
Table VII).  
 
TABLE V 

















 Cross tabs were used to assess the effect of the manipulations on the respondent’s 
recall for the presence of the ally and the lead-time to introduction.   Participants were 
asked to indicate the number of firms listed in the press release.  A χ2 test was performed 
and the results suggest that there is a significant association between the alliance 
manipulation and the manipulation check (χ2 = 20.33, df = 3, and p = 0.000).  Of those 
respondents in the alliance condition, 37 of the 51 subjects indicated that two firms 
appeared in the press release.  In contrast of those in the no ally condition, just 14 of 49 
subjects indicated that there were two firms (they should have chosen just one).  I also 
checked to see if this manipulation had an effect on the lead-time to introduction 
manipulation check.  A chi-square test was performed, the results showed that there was 
no effect on the timeline manipulation check (χ2 = 0.60, df = 3, and p = 0.90).   
 
 Participants in the research were also asked to respond to an item regarding the 
timeline to product introduction.  This was the manipulation check for the lead time 
manipulation in the stimuli.  Of those in the 12 month condition, 43 of 54 subjects 
reported correctly on the item.  When the condition stated 1 month, 27 of 46 reported 
correctly on the manipulation check.  However a common error was found, 11 subjects 
mistakenly indicated 3 months.  A chi-square test provided statistical testimony that the 
manipulation was successful (χ2 = 48.36, df = 3, and p = 0.000).  It is important to note 
that the timeline manipulation did not have any effect on the credibility (ally) 
manipulation check.  A chi-square test revealed the lack of association with the indicated 




 An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed on each of the two 
dependent variables: speed of response and strength of response.  This included the use of 
a covariate, consequence on sales, and the manipulated factors, credibility (ally) and 
hostility (time).  The model included an interaction between ally and time.   
 
I tested for mean differences on the variables understudy by nationality.  Finding 
none, I conducted all analysis on the entire MBA sample. 
 
 Regarding speed of response, the effects the hostility and credibility 
manipulations was not statistically significant.  The interaction term (ally×time) also had 
no effect on the speed of reaction, neither did the covariate – consequence of sales.  Table 









With respect to the strength of response variable, there was a significant main 
effect of the hostility manipulation.  However, the main effect of the credibility 
manipulation did not have a significant effect nor did the interaction term (Table XI).  
Nevertheless, since I proposed a complex effect between hostility and strength of 
response, I analyzed planned contrasts (Brown and Melamed 1990).  In doing so, I found 
that strength of response was significantly lower when there was no ally and lead-time to 
introduction was 1 month.  These findings contradict my conceptual reasoning.  As 
indicated in Figure D, response aggressiveness was lower when the signal was not 
credible and the timeline was short.   I was able to observe the treatment effects on 
aggressiveness of response only after accounting for the covariate measuring the 
respondent’s concern that the NPPA would affect the firm’s sales.  This implies 
mediation and provides support to the idea that aggressiveness of response is related to 
the perceived hostility of the NPPA signal.  In the case at hand, anticipated negative 
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consequences on sales are an indicator of the signals hostility (see the discussion on page 














 Based on the statistical analysis of the data, none of the proposed hypotheses 
received support.  Recall that H1A and H1B argued that signal credibility would increase 
both the aggressiveness of response and the speed of response.  In this study, credibility 
did not affect either response measure.  Similarly, H2A and H2B suggested that shorter 
lead-times to introduction would affect both speed and strength of response.  There was 
no significant effect on speed while the effect on strength was in the opposite direction of 
the hypotheses.  I also reasoned in H3A and H3B that there would be an interaction effect 
such that response would only occur when the signal was credible.  There was no effect 
on the speed measure.  The interaction term on the strength dependent variable was non-
significant, however, planned contrasts indicated that lead-time to introduction had an 
effect on strength of response when there was no ally.  Further, the strength of response 
was lower in the shorter lead-time condition than in the longer lead-time condition.  Thus, 








 This chapter aims to summarize the results of this thesis, discuss its limitations, 
and provide recommendations for future research on the subject. 
 
Discussion of Results 
My goal in this thesis was to advance the marketing literature by looking into the 
dynamic relationships between NPPA signals and competitive reactions within a globally 
competitive consumer electronics industry.  My hypotheses were designed to test the 
relationships between an incumbent’s level of perceived hostility and perceived 
credibility, within an NPPA signal, with the speed and strength with which they respond 
to the signal itself. 
 
I found that the empirical results generally do not support the hypotheses offered 
in this thesis.  In particular, there was no effect of the manipulations on speed of 
response.  Since H1B, H2B, and H3B were related to speed of response, this discounted my 
ability to test those specific hypotheses leaving me to unable to reach conclusions for any 
of them.  My data does not support the propositions that the presence of an ally will lead 
to a speedier response, the shorter the lead-time to product introduction will lead to a 
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faster response, and the presence of a shorter lead-time will lead to a fast response only in 
the presence of an ally. 
 
As mentioned earlier, H1A and H1B dealt with signal credibility and strength and 
speed of response.  However, from the data that was collected, credibility did not have 
any effect on either strength or speed of response.  This further refutes any support for 
H1B, while lending no support to the proposition H1A that the presence of a globally 
reputable ally (which increases signal credibility) leads to a stronger reaction.   
 
I was able to observe an effect of aggressiveness of response after accounting for 
a covariate measuring the respondent’s concern that the new product introduction within 
the NPPA would affect the firm’s sales.  This suggested possible mediation, that hostility 
effects strength of response through a concern for sales, and supports the suggestion that 
strength or aggressiveness of response is related to the perceived hostility of the NPPA.   
Nevertheless, H2A and H2B suggested that shorter lead-times to introduction would affect 
both speed and strength of response.  From my analysis, I found no significant effect on 
speed while the effect on strength was in the opposite direction of the hypotheses, thereby 
refuting both hypotheses. 
 
For H3A and H3B I reasoned that there would be an interaction effect such that 
response, either faster or stronger, would only occur when the signal was credible.  This 
was based on the argument that if a signal is not credible, its perceived hostility carried 
no meaning to the incumbent.  From the analysis I found there was no effect on the speed 
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measure, meaning that regardless of the presence of an ally there was no effect on speed 
of response.  This provided no support for H3B.  This was once again probably due to the 
fact that my manipulations had no effect on perceived credibility. H3A argues for the 
interaction of perceived credibility between perceived hostility and strength of response. 
What I found was that the interaction term on the strength dependent variable was non-
significant, but planned contrasts indicated that lead-time to introduction had an effect on 
strength of response when there was no ally present. The analysis showed that response 
aggressiveness was lower when the signal was not credible and the timeline was short.  
Thus, the empirical evidence refutes H3A as well.  Once again the fact that I couldn’t 
measure perceived credibility played a role in refuting this and other hypotheses offered 
in the thesis. 
 
Limitations 
 Over the course of conducting this research and analyzing the data, it has become 
apparent that there are many limitations to this research.  Even though my hypotheses 
were offered based on logical conclusions from extant research, I was not able to offer 
support on any one of them.  There were problems with the items used to measure certain 
constructs and flaws in the data collection.  Below I offer a discussion about the 
fundamental problems with the research. 
 
One could argue that the conceptualizations of the various constructs in the 
research are incorrect.  However, based on the extant literature in the field of marketing 
and other related fields, the conceptualizations of the dependent and independent 
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variables seem to be reasonable if not an accurate representation of the constructs.  One 
of the major problems with this thesis is related to the constructs of perceived hostility 
and credibility, regardless I do not find evidence that this is due to problems with 
conceptualization of the constructs. 
 
When interpreting the results of the research, certain problems or shortcomings 
must be taken into consideration.  These include the sample size and sample selection, the 
measures for the items, the manipulations in the stimuli, lack of more pre-testing and 
other problems with data collection. 
 
Sample 
Though I was expecting to have 120 respondents to my data collection exercise, I 
was only able to retrieve 100 useable questionnaires.  This reduced my sample size to 25 
per cell.  In order to gain the adequate power and effect size, it is recommended for a 2×2 
factorial design to have 30 units per cell.  One of the major problems upon analyzing the 
data was lack of effect size, this issue may have been partially abated if I had more 
respondents in each cell.  Nevertheless there is no such guarantee that I would have 
attained adequate power and effect sizes.  Another probable problem is my choice of 
sample.  I used MBA students because it was it convenient given my timeframe and 
economical given the costs.  Using real world managers would have taken more time at a 





Another problem with my research was the items it used to measure the various 
constructs.  Though it was borrowed from extant literature in related areas, many 
problems with reliability and unidimensionality were encountered.  For example there 
were major issues with the four item measure of strength of response.  Probably, the use 
of better scales to measure the constructs would have a more positive out come for the 
hypotheses presented in this thesis.  In my opinion this was a major limitation of the 
research that was discovered post data collection. 
 
Stimuli 
The manipulations in the stimuli proved to be another shortcoming in the 
research.  Manipulations for credibility and hostility did not have the projected impact on 
the data.  The major problem was encountered with the manipulation for credibility, as 
perceived credibility had no significant effect on either speed or strength of response.  
This was probably because Max Inc. was viewed as having significant credibility in and 
of itself having pioneered the new product on its own, and viewing Apple Inc. as only a 
brand ally not related to the actual new product development.  This would imply that 
Apple Inc. did not have the effect intended, which was to provide credibility to a firm that 
was unknown and would probably have been perceived as having no credibility.  Another 
issue could have been the fact that Apple Inc. probably did not suggest any extra 
credibility within the NPPA to the respondents.  A third issue with the manipulations was 
the timeline to product introduction used to manipulate the perceived hostility.  Though 
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the two related manipulations of one month and one year to introductions were used to 
increase significance, no particular procedures were chosen to determine the time 
intervals, however the earlier launch date of one month had replaced an earlier plan to use 
a three month interval.  It is quite possible that the one month time interval signified a 
lack of time to respond, thereby having a negative impact on speed and strength of 
response, opposite to what was suggested.  On a side note, it is possible that the 
respondents did not know in what forms a response could have taken place, whether it 




Many of the limitations mentioned thus far could have been avoided to a certain 
extent if a more in depth pre-testing was performed prior to data collection.  Though a 
pre-test was done, it was conducted with just four marketing managers in the Stillwater 
area.  In conducting the pre-test, none of the measures were scrutinized in depth, and the 
manipulations were not checked for relevance and significant effects.  The scope of the 
pre-test which was conducted was limited; it was mainly geared towards rectifying any 
confusing or ambiguous aspects of the instrument. 
 
However, care was taken to make sure that the real world ally (Apple Inc.) did not 
have any major factors that would undermine its reputation or negatively influence its 





 Another shortcoming of this research was the data collection procedure.  The 
instruments were handed out randomly to the respondents in a classroom setting.  This 
method has no faults in and of  itself, however there are more controlled methods of 
collecting experimental data like in an experimental lab setting.  Since I did not use the 
latter method, I cannot ensure to what extent the respondents read and/or understood the 
stimuli attached to the instruments.  In a worst case scenario, the respondents probably 
did not read the stimuli completely thus explaining the results of the data analysis.  
However, I have no way of explaining how seriously the respondents answered the 
instrument, or what effect if any data collection procedures had on my results.   
 
Ultimately, there could be other limitations that I have not mentioned here since 
they could either not be observed or explained.  Regardless, the many weaknesses 
mentioned here have, in my opinion, tremendously influenced the results of the research.  
Below I discuss directions for future research, which take into account the limitations of 




 There are many fertile avenues for further research in this specific area of NPPA.  
However, I plan to first discuss recommendations to this particular study that are offered 
to solve the limitations of this study.   
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 There are various improvements that could be introduced to this particular study 
which could vastly improve the results of the study.  For one, it is imperative that future 
research try to obtain a sample size that exceeds 30 respondents per cell.  This would go a 
long way in ensuring the sample size required to attain an adequate amount of power and 
effect size within the data.  Secondly, the sample should ideally consist of real world 
managers rather than MBA students.  Though MBA students are adequate, real world 
managers possess experience and industry knowledge that could make a difference in the 
data collected. 
 
 A lot of the problems encountered in the data analysis portion of this thesis lead to 
problems with the items used to measure the constructs.  I strongly recommend using 
better measures in order to make the data collection more successful.  Even though I 
pulled the items from extant research, they did not seem to work.  I would recommend 
adopting Gerbing and Anderson’s (1988) procedures for developing better scales in an 
effort to collect accurate and useful data.  On a related note, further research needs to 
discuss the appropriateness of the manipulations used in the stimuli.  For example the 
timelines involved should be modified to provide an accurate reflection of real world new 
product introduction lead-times.  This should take into account that the short lead-time 
not be so short that it is perceived as having no time to respond.  In essence, better 
manipulation of perceived hostility and perceived credibility is strongly suggested.  
 
 Among my final recommendations, a more in depth pre-test is strongly advocated.  
A pre-test involves not just checking for questionnaire wording and sequence, but also for 
 
 61 
appropriateness and significance of manipulations, reliability, unidimensionality, and 
clarity of the instrument.  Ultimately, this research should have ideally been conducted in 
an experimental laboratory setting, where the stimuli would have been read aloud to the 
respondents.  This would ensure that the stimuli was clearly understood, and perhaps 
increase the effect of the manipulations. 
 
 An important area for further research would be to extend this study in a manner 
that truly focuses on the global markets.  This would begin by obtaining global samples, 
controlling country of origin effects, and examining the differences between the regional 
and global character of signal senders.  This would require adjustments to the stimuli, in 
attaining metric equivalence in other languages, and controlling culture specifically in 
respect to time. 
 
Other interesting areas of future research include looking at the causal 
relationships between the constructs mentioned in this research.  It became clear to me 
that the causal relationships suggested in extant literature, though based on logical 
deductions, might not hold.  There could be a host of moderator and mediator variables 
that play important roles in the reaction to NPPA signals.  Another fruitful area of 
research lays in an extensive scale development study.  Scales for perceived hostility, 
perceived credibility, strength of response, and speed of response etc. seem to hold little 
validity in extant research.  A rigorous scale development exercise based on Gerbing and 
Anderson (1988) would be useful to the field of marketing.  Last but not least, future 
research should be conducted in a manner that provides results that can have managerial 
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implications.  Vast areas remain to be explored, however without significant implications 
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